Reparations and Questions of Equity
In recent years, there has been an increased focus on the fomentation of justice for individuals who, to no fault of their own, suffer the negative consequences of environmental degradation or inequity. Some have argued that when harm is done to a person or population, one of the steps necessary to equity is achieved through a form of compensation to these groups or individuals. While many tend to associate reparations with monetary payments, there are other manners in which they may come to fruition. For instance, reparations can include restitution, or returning the harmed population to its initial standing. Other examples may include rehabilitation, satisfaction or even guarantees of non-repetition. While many may not consider these actions to be included in the broad category of reparations, the modern philosopher should not seek to exclude them from his or her analysis of the morality of reparations. It is under this set of circumstances that one may make an array of parallels between environmental justice techniques and those discussed earlier seeking to provide certain amends for past actions against marginalized racial and ethnic groups.
Before describing the various ways in which Caney’s arguments about climate change reparations apply to the issue of reparations for slavery, it is first beneficial to address the current situation pertaining to racial justice in the United States and worldwide. In her Ted Talk “The Racial Politics of Time,” Brittney Cooper describes how the very sense of time in which society lives has been directly affected by racist power dynamics. Caucasian historical figures being linked to the creation of certain inventions has long been utilized as a form of cudgel to diminish the significant role that communities of color have played in the shaping of the modern world (Cooper 3:54-5:47). As described in her video, Cooper discusses how Africa was viewed as a continent, while certainly the largest in the world, that was not central to world history. (Cooper 6:35-7:02). This, of course, is not a valid argument and has been used for centuries to marginalize the contribution of Africans and other large groups of individuals from the creation of the modern world.
As discussed by Philosopher Taiwo, a Professor of African Studies at Cornell University, Black Americans have consistently lived with the very negative consequences of this worldview. Gentrification practices are considered without an honest analysis of how these policies continue the practice of moving people of color away from situations in which they may not be “desired” by the White population (Taiwo 27:55-31:22). This leads to more segregation and the continuation of a timeline in which White individuals create time and others must be formed to this understanding, uncomfortably shaping their lives until their rights and moral compensation are finally accepted by the general public. This scenario presents a timeline in which the oppressed are only accepted when those participating in the oppression consider it the appropriate time. There is no doubt that in a situation like this, particularly when reparations for slavery are brought into the conversation, Caney’s arguments on environmental reparations relate significantly to these issues.
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Blog Question Responses
Caney describes the various problems that often arise in the philosophical argumentation for reparations. As he writes early in his article, “Theories of Reparations must contain answers to the following questions: (Q1) Who is the rights-bearer? (Who is entitled to the compensation?); (Q2) Who is the duty-bearer (Who should bear the burden of compensation?); (Q3) What counts as an injustice? (What Principles of civil, political, environmental, and economic justice are there?); (Q4) What form should the compensation take? (Paying financial support? Making an apology?); (Q5) How much is owed? (How does one determine appropriate recompense for racial injustices, say?)” (Caney 465). Here, Caney describes that the philosopher must consider a series of questions to address the reality and feasibility of reparations in an effort to address the injustices of the past, specifically, pertaining to environmental harm and climate change. Nevertheless, the answers to these questions have the potential to become very complicated upon a more profound analysis. For example, Caney explains how he believes that the first two questions he poses are of particular importance to examining the situation of reparations.
The first issue with deciphering who would be responsible in providing the necessary reparations to the environmentally-damaged populations would pertain to the entities that are often listed as responsible for the harm caused. Modern philosophers and historians have focused on the role that nations have played in this process, but this overlooks the role of corporations, individuals and international organizations. Placing all of the blame on a state may risk both blaming those within the entity that did not partake in the environmental degradation as well as letting other corporations get off scoff-free (Caney 467). The same could be said with the practice of slavery reparations, as we so often argue that offending nations should pay the price for this abuse. Nevertheless, we must remember that doing so ignores the contribution that individuals and corporations (as well as international businesses) have played in this injustice.
In addition to this, it is noteworthy that many of the people and entities who were perpetrators in some of the worst environmental damage are no longer alive or in existence. This raises the question of who should truly be held responsible for this tragedy. Those in power during the 20th century in Europe and much of the modern industrialized world oversaw large increases in industrialization and the emission of greenhouse gases. However, if these entities do not exist today, should those who are alive today pay the prices for these actions (Caney 471)? To do so, according to Carey, would not make complete sense. Not only is it possible that those who live today do not support the policies of the past, but also, their ancestors may actually have been victims of them. Carey speaks to the issue of how many of the immigrants who fled to Britain during the 20th century in search of a better life may have arrived after the period of mass industrialization (Caney 471). Therefore, not even the ancestors of modern individuals may be entirely to blame. This same argument has arisen in relation to reparations to slavery in which many may have immigrated to the country after its official ban. Would it be just to create a situation in which these individuals must pay for the sins of the past (of which they have no direct connection, necessarily)? This is just one more question that Caney poses in his analysis of the many challenges to the argument of reparations for environmental injustice (which relates heavily to the idea of support for reparations for slavery.
(Here are three videos relating to one professor's view on reparations and environmental justice):
https://youtu.be/mOkG_d44ov0
https://youtu.be/dREtXUij6_c
https://youtu.be/A_RWuzSyFw0
Bibliography
Caney, Simon. “Environmental Degradation, Reparations, and the Moral Significance of History.” Wiley Online Library, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 7 Sept. 2006, onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9833.2006.00348.x.
Cooper, Brittney. “The Racial Politics of Time.” TED, 2016, www.ted.com/talks/brittney_cooper_the_racial_politics_of_time.
Taiwo, Olufemi O. “Earth to Philosophy.” OLÚFẸ́MI O. TÁÍWÒ, 2020, www.olufemiotaiwo.com/.



Hi Drew,
ReplyDeleteI really enjoyed reading your post! And I would like to hear your opinion about why do you think Caney approaches reparation through a human rights point of view?
Mouda
Hello Mouda,
ReplyDeleteI hope this response finds you well!
Thank you very much for your comment on this blog post, as well as your question regarding why Caney approaches reparations through a human rights point of view. Caney uses an integrationist view (which includes human rights) because he argues that with the uncertainty associated with many questions of reparations (who will be responsible for them, who will receive them, etc.), it is possible to recognize historical injustices without calling for reparations (477). His explanations of the common issues associated with reparations become more clear when one connects them to the topic of human rights, as this inherently brings equity and fairness into the equation. For example, Caney points to the predicament that it may not be just to make current individuals responsible for events which they do not have direct relation to (from past generations). This could provoke questions of whether it would be a violation of current generations' human rights to be made to remunerate past environmental injustices with which they have no direct connection. I would like to know your opinion regarding whether having individuals pay for events with which they are not directly connected would be less immoral than having individuals who are affected by past injustices not receive acts of reparation. Many would argue that if someone or their family were unfairly deprived of resources or abused, then they are ultimately entitled to some form of compensation.
I thank you in advance for your response!
Best,
Drew Califano